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:: Volume 2, Issue 1 (vol 2. No 1 2010) ::
IJOR 2010, 2(1): 62-76 Back to browse issues page
Competition, complementarity and service level guarantee in Web services
Habibi Badrabadi , Tarokh
Abstract:   (26936 Views)

  Network and processing overhead associated with web services is a significant challenge to its performance. As a result, web service providers often announce a service level agreement. This ensures that consumers, who pay for the service, can get the service at a given quality level. In this paper, we study the competition between two providers offering functionally the same web services, where there is a monopoly service provider who offers a service that is complementary to their services. Each provider needs to decide a service level (L or H) he/she would offer and a corresponding price for the selected service level to meet the QoS guarantee. We combine modeling constructs from game theory and queuing theory to propose a model that can provide useful insights to service providers about pricing and general competitive strategies.


Keywords: Web services, WSLA, Pricing, Game theory, Queuing theory, Competition, Complementarity.
Full-Text [PDF 399 kb]   (6464 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Original |
Received: 2011/04/20 | Published: 2010/04/15
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Volume 2, Issue 1 (vol 2. No 1 2010) Back to browse issues page
مجله انجمن ایرانی تحقیق در عملیات Iranian Journal of Operations Research
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