<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<journal>
<title>Iranian Journal of Operations Research</title>
<title_fa>مجله انجمن ایرانی تحقیق در عملیات</title_fa>
<short_title>IJOR</short_title>
<subject>Basic Sciences</subject>
<web_url>http://iors.ir/journal</web_url>
<journal_hbi_system_id>0</journal_hbi_system_id>
<journal_hbi_system_user>user</journal_hbi_system_user>
<journal_id_issn>2008-1189</journal_id_issn>
<journal_id_issn_online></journal_id_issn_online>
<journal_id_pii></journal_id_pii>
<journal_id_doi>10.66224/iors</journal_id_doi>
<journal_id_iranmedex></journal_id_iranmedex>
<journal_id_magiran></journal_id_magiran>
<journal_id_sid></journal_id_sid>
<journal_id_nlai></journal_id_nlai>
<journal_id_science></journal_id_science>
<language>en</language>
<pubdate>
	<type>jalali</type>
	<year>1405</year>
	<month>6</month>
	<day>1</day>
</pubdate>
<pubdate>
	<type>gregorian</type>
	<year>2026</year>
	<month>9</month>
	<day>1</day>
</pubdate>
<volume>17</volume>
<number>2</number>
<publish_type>online</publish_type>
<publish_edition>1</publish_edition>
<article_type>fulltext</article_type>
<articleset>
	<article>


	<language>en</language>
	<article_id_doi></article_id_doi>
	<title_fa></title_fa>
	<title>Threshold Coalition Games: A New Cooperative Game Model with Stability Analysis</title>
	<subject_fa>Mathematical Modeling and Applications of OR</subject_fa>
	<subject>Mathematical Modeling and Applications of OR</subject>
	<content_type_fa>پژوهشی</content_type_fa>
	<content_type>Original</content_type>
	<abstract_fa></abstract_fa>
	<abstract>&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;line-height:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;text-autospace:none&quot;&gt;&lt;span new=&quot;&quot; roman=&quot;&quot; style=&quot;font-family:&quot; times=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:10.0pt&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;letter-spacing:-.25pt&quot;&gt;Cooperative game theory is an important tool for analyzing cooperation and benefit allocation among coalition members, but classical models usually do not consider the existence of a minimum capacity required for cooperation to be activated. In this study, &amp;ldquo;threshold coalition games&amp;rdquo; are introduced, in which the formation of an effective coalition requires crossing a certain threshold of collective capacity. Also, a coalition activation index and a new rule called &amp;ldquo;threshold allocation value&amp;rdquo; are presented to determine the players&amp;rsquo; shares, and their properties, including efficiency, symmetry, and uniqueness, are proven. Finally, a numerical example shows that the proposed model can model threshold-based cooperation structures coherently and provides a suitable framework for future research in cooperative game theory.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;
&amp;nbsp;</abstract>
	<keyword_fa></keyword_fa>
	<keyword>cooperative game theory, threshold coalition games, characteristic function, benefit allocation, coalition stability, mathematical modeling</keyword>
	<start_page>56</start_page>
	<end_page>81</end_page>
	<web_url>http://iors.ir/journal/browse.php?a_code=A-10-6111-1&amp;slc_lang=en&amp;sid=1</web_url>


<author_list>
	<author>
	<first_name>Forouzesh</first_name>
	<middle_name></middle_name>
	<last_name>Ghambari</last_name>
	<suffix></suffix>
	<first_name_fa></first_name_fa>
	<middle_name_fa></middle_name_fa>
	<last_name_fa></last_name_fa>
	<suffix_fa></suffix_fa>
	<email>forouzesh.ghambari@gmail.com</email>
	<code>00031947532846003206</code>
	<orcid>00031947532846003206</orcid>
	<coreauthor>Yes
</coreauthor>
	<affiliation>Payame Noor University of Markazi</affiliation>
	<affiliation_fa></affiliation_fa>
	 </author>


	<author>
	<first_name>Mahdi </first_name>
	<middle_name></middle_name>
	<last_name>Ahangari</last_name>
	<suffix></suffix>
	<first_name_fa></first_name_fa>
	<middle_name_fa></middle_name_fa>
	<last_name_fa></last_name_fa>
	<suffix_fa></suffix_fa>
	<email></email>
	<code>00031947532846003207</code>
	<orcid>00031947532846003207</orcid>
	<coreauthor>No</coreauthor>
	<affiliation>Urmia University of Technology</affiliation>
	<affiliation_fa></affiliation_fa>
	 </author>


</author_list>


	</article>
</articleset>
</journal>
