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Showing 5 results for Pricing

Mohammad Modarres, Ehsan Bolandifar,
Volume 1, Issue 1 (5-2008)


  We extend the concept of dynamic pricing by integrating it with “overselling with opportunistic cancellation” option, within the framework of dynamic policy. Under this strategy, to sell a stock of perishable product (or capacity) two prices are offered to customers at any given time period. Customers are categorized as high-paying and low-paying ones. The seller deliberately oversells its capacity if high paying customers show up, even when the capacity is already fully booked by low-paying customers. In that case, the sale to some low-paying customers is canceled, although an appropriate compensation must be provided. A dynamic programming approach is applied to formulate and solve this problem. We develop two models for continuous and periodic pricing, depending on the frequency of price changing. The advantage of this system over dynamic pricing model is investigated through some numerical examples. We also study some structural properties of the optimal policies.

Habibi Badrabadi, Tarokh,
Volume 2, Issue 1 (4-2010)

  Network and processing overhead associated with web services is a significant challenge to its performance. As a result, web service providers often announce a service level agreement. This ensures that consumers, who pay for the service, can get the service at a given quality level. In this paper, we study the competition between two providers offering functionally the same web services, where there is a monopoly service provider who offers a service that is complementary to their services. Each provider needs to decide a service level (L or H) he/she would offer and a corresponding price for the selected service level to meet the QoS guarantee. We combine modeling constructs from game theory and queuing theory to propose a model that can provide useful insights to service providers about pricing and general competitive strategies.


M. Azari Khojasteh, M. Amin-Naseri, S.h. Zegordi,
Volume 4, Issue 2 (10-2013)

We develop a price competition model for a new supply chain that competes in a market comprised of some rival supply chains. The new supply chain has one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer in which the manufacturer is a leader and retailer is a follower. The manufacturer pays a fraction of the risk cost (caused by demand uncertainty) to the retailer. We apply this competitive model to a real-world case in a supply chain under uncertain environment and obtain the optimal wholesale and retail prices. We show that our obtained prices are better than the existing wholesale and retail prices and admit more profits for both manufacturer and retailer and generally for the entire supply chain. Also, using this case, the effects of risk sensitivity of retailer and fraction of risk cost shared by manufacturer in the total risk cost on the new supply chain’s optimal wholesale and retail prices and profits are illustrated.
Mahdi Shafiei, Professor Mohammad Modarres,
Volume 7, Issue 1 (4-2016)

We develop a new coordination contract of manufacturer-retailer in a distribution system. A revenue sharing contract based on retail price is modelled, which is more practical to handle channel conflict. We also integrate two concepts of CSR (Corporate Sociality Responsible) and Semi-TDPD (Semi Third Degree Price Discrimination) into our model. Semi-TDPD strategy makes it possible to exploit the opportunity of customer behavior, by adopting a price discrimination strategy. According to this strategy, some customers who cannot or are not willing to pay the posted price, are allowed to purchase at lower prices through bargaining. To illustrate the proposed approach, we present some numerical examples. Through these examples, we investigate the impact of CSR and Semi-TDPD on decisions and also the good performance of this coordination.

Mrs. Mahdieh Zarei, Dr. Hamid Mashreghi, Dr. Saeed Emami,
Volume 10, Issue 1 (7-2019)

Nowadays, airline industries should overcome different barriers regarding the fierce competition and changing consumer behavior. Thus, they attempt to focus on joint decision making which enables them to set pricing and capacity allocation to maximize their profits. In this research, we develop a model to optimize pricing and capacity allocation in a duopoly of single-flight leg for two competitive airlines. The problem considers actual assumptions about flexible partitions in flight’s cabins and additionally demand uncertainty. There is a flexible partitioning of business and economy cabins and demand is assumed price-dependent with additive uncertainty. The capacity and pricing decisions are simultaneously determined through indirect channels. Moreover, a numerical study is developed to investigate how market components and competition conditions change pricing, capacity, and profit levels. The results show that increasing market volume like decreasing price sensitivity provides higher levels of price and profits. Moreover, intensified competition never leads to higher prices. Thus, a competitive network of airlines provides better impact on market mechanism to achieve competitive prices for both economy and business classes.

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مجله انجمن ایرانی تحقیق در عملیات Iranian Journal of Operations Research
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