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We develop a price competition model for a new supply chain that competes in a market comprised of some rival supply chains. The new supply chain has one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer in which the manufacturer is a leader and retailer is a follower. The manufacturer pays a fraction of the risk cost (caused by demand uncertainty) to the retailer. We apply this competitive model to a real-world case in a supply chain under uncertain environment and obtain the optimal wholesale and retail prices. We show that our obtained prices are better than the existing wholesale and retail prices and admit more profits for both manufacturer and retailer and generally for the entire supply chain. Also, using this case, the effects of risk sensitivity of retailer and fraction of risk cost shared by manufacturer in the total risk cost on the new supply chain’s optimal wholesale and retail prices and profits are illustrated.

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In this paper the pricing of reverse products in a two-level closed-loop supply chain is considered and a game theory approach is used to solve it. Pricing is a sensitive and vital issue for businesses. In the market of reverse products, this issue will be much more difficult and complex due to difficulties associated with collecting and re-manufacturing processes. On the other hand, the use of the internet and direct channels for collecting products from customers alongside traditional retailers is an important issue that requires management and coordination. The proposed price for buying second-hand and defective products from customers should be high enough to convince them that returning the products has more benefits than discarding or keeping them at home. At the same time, the price should be low enough to make it economically viable for producers to carry out the repair and re-manufacturing operations and resell them in the direct supply chain for the producer. The use of game theory, where the decisions of one player affect the decisions and outcomes of other players as well as their outcomes, is a suitable method for solving the problem of pricing reverse products in a two-level closed-loop supply chain

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Cooperative game theory is an important tool for analyzing cooperation and benefit allocation among coalition members, but classical models usually do not consider the existence of a minimum capacity required for cooperation to be activated. In this study, “threshold coalition games” are introduced, in which the formation of an effective coalition requires crossing a certain threshold of collective capacity. Also, a coalition activation index and a new rule called “threshold allocation value” are presented to determine the players’ shares, and their properties, including efficiency, symmetry, and uniqueness, are proven. Finally, a numerical example shows that the proposed model can model threshold-based cooperation structures coherently and provides a suitable framework for future research in cooperative game theory.