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Showing 1 results for Threshold Coalition Games
Forouzesh Ghambari, Mahdi Ahangari,
Volume 17, Issue 2 (9-2026)
Abstract
Cooperative game theory is an important tool for analyzing cooperation and benefit allocation among coalition members, but classical models usually do not consider the existence of a minimum capacity required for cooperation to be activated. In this study, “threshold coalition games” are introduced, in which the formation of an effective coalition requires crossing a certain threshold of collective capacity. Also, a coalition activation index and a new rule called “threshold allocation value” are presented to determine the players’ shares, and their properties, including efficiency, symmetry, and uniqueness, are proven. Finally, a numerical example shows that the proposed model can model threshold-based cooperation structures coherently and provides a suitable framework for future research in cooperative game theory.
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