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Threshold Coalition Games: A New Cooperative Game Model with Stability Analysis
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چکیده: (44 مشاهده) |
Cooperative game theory is an important tool for analyzing cooperation and benefit allocation among coalition members, but classical models usually do not consider the existence of a minimum capacity required for cooperation to be activated. In this study, “threshold coalition games” are introduced, in which the formation of an effective coalition requires crossing a certain threshold of collective capacity. Also, a coalition activation index and a new rule called “threshold allocation value” are presented to determine the players’ shares, and their properties, including efficiency, symmetry, and uniqueness, are proven. Finally, a numerical example shows that the proposed model can model threshold-based cooperation structures coherently and provides a suitable framework for future research in cooperative game theory.
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متن کامل [PDF 1096 kb]
(16 دریافت)
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نوع مطالعه: پژوهشی |
موضوع مقاله:
Mathematical Modeling and Applications of OR
دریافت: 1405/2/11 | پذیرش: 1405/6/19 | انتشار: 1405/6/26
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